Auslese, natürliche

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franz.			Gegenbegriffe
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B. Sekundärmaterial

Begriffsgeschichtliche Arbeiten

Sonstige Literatur

Canguilhem, G.: Les concepts de “lutte pour l’existence” et de “sélection naturelle” en 1958: Charles Darwin et Alfred Russel Wallace. Paris, 1959.
- Rezension: J. Théodoridès, Archives Internationales d’Histoire des Sciences 12, 1959, S. 332-333.

Claeys, Gregory: The "Survival of the Fittest" and the Origins of Social Darwinism, in: Journal of the History of Ideas 61/2 (2000) S. 223-240.

Darwin, Charles, Alfred Russel Wallace, George Sarton, Charles Lyell, and Jos. D. Hooker: Discovery of the Theory of Natural Selection. Isis 14, 1930, S. 133-154.

Grene, Marjorie: Statistics and Selection. The British Journal for the Philosophie of Science XII, 1961 XII, S. 25-42. Vorschau

Ruse, Michael: Natural selection in The Origin of Species. Studies In History and Philosophy of Science Part A 1/4, 1971, S. 311-351.

Stephens, Christopher: Natural selection. Handbook of the Philosophy of Science 2007, S. 111-127.

Sarton, George: Darwin's Conception of the Theory of Natural Selection. Isis 26, 1937, S. 336-340.

Sober, Elliott and Steven Hecht Orzack: Common Ancestry and Natural Selection. The British Journal for the Philosophie of Science 54, 2003 S. 423-437.

Abstract: We explore the evidential relationships that connect two standard claims of modern evolutionary biology. The hypothesis of common ancestry (which says that all organisms now on earth trace back to a single progenitor) and the hypothesis of natural selection (which says that natural selection has been an important influence on the traits exhibited by organisms) are logically independent; however, this leaves open whether testing one requires assumptions about the status of the other. Darwin noted that an extreme version of adaptationism would undercut the possibility of making inferences about common ancestry. Here we develop a converse claim—hypotheses that assert that natural selection has been an important influence on trait values are untestable unless supplemented by suitable background assumptions. The fact of common ancestry and a claim about quantitative genetics together suffice to render such hypotheses testable. Furthermore, we see no plausible alternative to these assumptions; we hypothesize that they are necessary as well as sufficient for adaptive hypotheses to be tested. This point has important implications for biological practice, since biologists standardly assume that adaptive hypotheses predict trait associations among tip species. Another consequence is that adaptive hypotheses cannot be confirmed or disconfirmed by a trait value that is universal within a single species, if that trait value deviates even slightly from the optimum.

Vorzimmer, Peter: Darwin, Malthus, and the Theory of Natural Selection. Journal of the History of Ideas 30.4, (1969) S. 527-542.

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Kategorien: Biologie